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COMPUTERIZED CRIMINAL RECORDS: THE DUTY OF THE
FBI TO MAINTAIN AND DISSEMINATE ACCURATE FILES- Tarlton v.
Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The use and dissemination of criminal records' for routine suspect checks, sentencing and parole hearing has been the subject of
much recent discussion.' Much of the controversy revolves around
the increased access to criminal history files through the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) which serves as a clearing
house for law enforcement agencies throughout the nation.' Due to
conflicting court decisions and varying state statutes,4 the rights,
requirements and limitations for expunging these records are presently in a state of confusion. 5
1. Criminal records include both "police blotters" and criminal history records. "Police
blotters" or "arrest books" are chronological reports of all persons incarcerated by law enforcement personnel. According to state or federal statutes they are usually public records
and are, therefore, open to the public or the press and outside the scope of this note. "Criminal history records" include arrest and conviction records on a specific individual and are not
available to the public at large. The term "arrest record" includes records of all full-custody
arrests and temporary detentions. It refers to centrally maintained records which list an
arrestee's identity, the date and place of the arrest, the offense(s) and the status or disposition
of the charge(s). The term "conviction record" refers to any record which indicates that a
person has been convicted of any crime. Often conviction records are the same as updated
arrest records, but they also include conviction data on persons summoned to appear to
answer criminal charges and never subject to arrest. See generally COLLEGE OF LAW, ARIZONA
STATE UNIVERSITY AND POLICE FOUNDATION, MODEL RULES: RELEASE OF ARREST AND CONVICTION

RECORDS (1974).
2. Cohen, "CriminalRecords"-A ComparativeApproach, 4 GA. J. OF INT'L L. & COMp.
L. 116 (1974); Hemphill, Protection of Privacy of Computerized Records in the National
Crime Information Center, 7 J. OF L. REF. 594 (1974); Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an Information OrientedSociety, 67 MICH.
L. REV. 1089 (1969); Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275 (1974); Comment, Arrest Records-Protectingthe Innocent, 48 TUL. L. REV. 629 (1974); Comment,
Branded: Arrest Records of the Unconvicted, 44 Miss. L.J. 928 (1973); Note. Discrimination
on the Basis of Arrest Records, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 470 (1971); Comment, Police Records of
Arrest: A Brief for the Right to Remove Them From Police Files, 17 ST. Louis U.L.J. 263
(1972).
3. It was noted in Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 721 (D.D.C. 1971) that there
are over 19 million fingerprint cards relating to criminal activity on file at the NCIC.
4. For examples of state statutes dealing with criminal history files in contrasting
fashion, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 206-3 (1973); ORE. REV. STAT. § 181.540 (1973); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-90 (1972).
5. There is a growing realization on the part of the judiciary that some semblance of
order must be made out of the chaos surrounding criminal records and their dissemination.
At present, however, decisions are contradictory. Some courts deny expungement relief,
weighting heavily the need for public safety and effective law enforcement. Hershel v. Dyra,
Del. Ch.
365 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973 (1966); Walker v. Lamb, __
__,
254 A.2d 265 (1969); Kolb v. O'Connor, 14 Ill. App. 2d 81, 142 N.E.2d 818 (1957). Some
cases deny expungement relief, but place certain restrictions on the dissemination of arrest
records and their content. Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971); Spock v.
District of Columbia, 283 A.2d 14 (D.C. App. 1971). A third group of decisions would permit
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The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has previously considered the broad issue of dissemination of arrest records in Menard
v. Mitchell.' The court noted four types of arrest for which expungement might be proper: (1) those not based on probable cause and
not made in good faith; (2) those not based on probable cause but
with good faith intentions; (3) those made with probable cause, but
where officials may have knowledge that further investigation would
probably exonerate the individual; (4) those made with probable
cause but where judicial procedures were not utilized. In a subsequent proceeding,7 the court further interpreted the statute pertaining to the collection of arrest records' as imposing a duty on the FBI
to expunge information from its criminal file when the local agency
which first reported that information to the FBI later reports information which puts in doubt the accuracy of the relevant FBI record.
The subsequent litigation in Tarlton v. Saxbel involved the issue of
whether the FBI has a further affirmative duty to assure the accuracy of its files with respect to both arrest and conviction records.
I.

TARLTON'S COMPLAINT

Petitioner John Tarlton brought an action against the Attorney
General and the Director of the FBI to have certain information
expunged from his criminal file. The information contained in the
NCIC included several entries of arrests for which there was no
ultimate disposition indicated and additional arrests and convictions which he alleged were perpetrated in violation of his constitutional rights. He alleged that the incomplete and inaccurate information supplied from the FBI's NCIC records had influenced a
court in imposing sentence on him and had influenced the parole
board's decision to deny him parole. The district court dismissed
Tarlton's complaint for failure to state a cause of action.'" The court
expungement relief in "extreme circumstances": Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.
1973), United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967) (police misconduct); Wheeler
v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (arrests based on unconstitutionally vague
statutes); United States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121 (D.C. Nev. 1975) (arrests based on
inaccurate FBI information). Still other courts have held that there is a fundamental right
to have arrest records returned upon acquittal implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
without regard to legislative action or to the presence of special circumstances justifying
relief. Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (1972); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App.
334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971).
6. 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
7. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1970).
9. 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
10. Tarlton v. Mitchell, Civil No. 1862-71 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 1971).
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of appeals reversed and remanded by a 2-1 majority."
Before reaching the merits, the court noted that it was not
deciding the issues of whether the FBI must guarantee the accuracy
of information in its files; whether the FBI must resolve conflicting
allegations as to the accuracy of its records; or, whether the FBI may
properly retain records of arrests if the accused is later acquitted or
the charge dropped. The court pointed out that in the present case
the first two questions would be resolved against Tarlton. The issue
was framed as follows:
[T]o what extent, if any, does the FBI have a duty to take reasonable measures to safeguard the accuracy of information in its criminal
files which is subject to dissemination."
The majority's holding was limited to the finding that Tarlton
had stated a cause of action,, relating to the nature and extent, if
any, of the duty of inquiry to be placed on the FBI with respect to
the accuracy of their NCIC files. According to the court's reasoning,
the FBI is more than a mere passive repository of records received
from others since the FBI "energizes"'" those records by maintaining
a system of criminal files and by disseminating the records on a
nation-wide basis. The FBI cannot avoid all responsibility for inaccuracies which might injure innocentindividuals by a printed disclaimer; neither is it the guarantor of the accuracy of information
in its criminal files. Therefore, it would be the task of the district
court on remand to determine standards of reasonable care within
the FBI's capacity to insure the accuracy of the information. Since
it has previously been held that the FBI has a duty to take notice
of reliable information furnished by local law enforcement agencies,' 4 the district court might inquire whether persuasive reasons
exist for not extending this duty to a more general duty of care.,'
11. 507 F.2d 1116.
12. Id. at 1121.
13. Id. at 1126.
14. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
15. The majority's reasoning for a more general duty of care is supported by 42 U.S.C.
§ 3771(b)(1973)-applicable to all "criminal history information" maintained by "state and
local government" with LEAA funds-which states:
All criminal history information collected, stored, or disseminated through support under this chapter shall contain, to the maximum extent feasible, disposition as
well as arrest data where arrest data is included therein. The collection, storage, and
dissemination of such information shall take place under procedures reasonably designed to insure that all such information is kept current therein; the Administration
shall assure that the security and privacy of all information is adequately provided for
and that information shall only be used for law enforcement and criminal justice and
other lawful purposes. In addition, an individual who believes that criminal history
information concerning him contained in an automated system is inaccurate, incom-
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Judge Wilkey dissented. First, he argued, the majority placed
a primarily legislative task on a district court judge-that of overseeing the operation of the FBI. If additional legislation was deemed
essential, the judge was directed to write an appropriate judicial
amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 534.16 Second, in addressing the FBI's
duty and responsibility, the majority had all but ignored Tarlton
and impliedly ruled against him on his main contentions. Third, the
"duty" referred to would inevitably compel the FBI to judge the
"constitutional accuracy" 17 of the criminal information contained in
its criminal history records.
II.

THE COURT'S STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF SECTION

534

In determining that a cause of action existed, the majority held
that the FBI had "some duty" to prevent the dissemination of inaccurate arrest and conviction records-the extent of which was to be
determined by the district court. This duty was based on a statutory
interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 534.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia previously
interpreted this statute to include certain limitations: (1) the FBI
could not make available to prospective employers for licensing or
for related purposes any arrest records which did not result in prosecution;"8 (2) the FBI had to expunge records of reported "arrests"
when the contributing police agencies corrected the report and
established that the incident involved nothing more than an enplete or maintained in violation of this chapter, shall, upon satisfactory verification of
his identify, be entitled to review such information and to obtain a copy of it for the
purpose of challenge or correction.
Further, the NCIC Advisory Policy Board issued a statement in late 1973 outlining privacy
and confidentiality policy with particular emphasis on the computerized criminal history file
(CCH). For a summary of that statement see Memorandum to the Legislature of Nebraska
on L.B. 524 (1975).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1970) provides:
(a) The Attorney General shall(1) acquire, collect, classify and preserve identification, criminal identification, crime
and other records; and
(2) exchange these records with, and for the official use of, authorized officials of the
Federal Government, the States, cities, and penal and other institutions.
(b) The exchange of records authorized by subsection (a)(2) of this section is subject
to cancellation of dissemination if made outside the recognized departments or related
agencies.
(c) The Attorney General may appoint officials to perform the functions of this section.
17. As the dissent points out, the majority makes numerous references to "accuracy and
constitutional accuracy" of FBI files. "Accuracy" seems to refer to the factual accuracy and
completeness of the information contained in the file, while "constitutional accuracy" refers
to "records of arrest which are constitionally invulnerable to challenge." 507 F.2d at 1137.
18. Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971).
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counter with the police. 9 This interpretation could be justified by
the argument that 28 U.S.C. § 534 must be narrowly interpreted to
avoid violation of an individual's constitutional rights. The court,
in Tarlton, again interpreted the statute to require such reasonable
care as the FBI is able to afford to avoid injury to innocent citizens
through dissemination of inaccurate information. Absent clear language, Congress cannot be imputed to intend to authorize the FBI
to damage the reputation of innocent individuals contrary to settled
common law principles (in this case, libel, slander, and the right of
privacy)2 ° and federal courts should interpret statutes as consistent
with existing law unless contrary legislative intent appears. Thus,
the statute must be interpreted in a manner designed to prevent
government dissemination of inaccurate criminal information without reasonable precautions to insure accuracy.
This reasoning is sound. However, from this origin, the court
delved far beyond mere interpretation and, in effect, suggested a
major rewriting of the statute. After hastily determining that at this
stage of the proceeding petitioner had stated a cause of action, the
majority went on to posit what appeared to be more in the order of
a general treatise on a complicated area of the law, rather than an
opinion bearing on the facts and petitioner at hand.
First, the majority appears to have forgotten, at least tacitly,
about Tarlton's substantive allegations. Tarlton's complaint involved several arrests for which no ultimate disposition was indicated and arrests and convictions which he alleged had been perpetrated in violation of his constitutional rights. He did not challenge
the FBI's right to disseminate records of complete and constitutionally accurate arrests and convictions, nor did he allege that any
information had been disseminated to unauthorized persons. Tarlton impliedly argued that the FBI had to either verify or eliminate
each and every arrest and conviction on his record. The majority
rejected this as neither legally required nor factually possible. The
FBI could not be expected to investigate the facts underlying each
arrest or detention and is not authorized to make judgments concerning questions of constitutional interpretation. The district court
could not be expected to review the constitutionality and relitigate
the merits of all arrests and convictions on file at the NCIC. Furthermore, considerations of federal-state comity require that local
courts should make initial determinations as to the validity of arrests and convictions. What then remains of Tarlton's cause of ac19.
20.

Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
See PROSSER, TORTS, §§ 112 and 117 (4th ed. 1971).
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tion? It would seem that his arguments are effectively denied and
that his case is doomed to fail on the merits.
Yet, the majority finds a cause of action and suggests that the
duty established in Menard v. Saxbe,2' to take notice of information
supplied by local law enforcement agencies, might be extended to
require a more affirmative duty of care, e.g., to request local law
enforcement agencies to comment on and document adequately the
factual basis of allegations submitted to the FBI challenging the
accuracy of prior information submitted by local agencies, to be
responsible for keeping their files reasonably current, or to revise
forms so as to require the addition of subsequent information on the
crime reported. 2
III.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION

534

As appropriate as these procedures might be, they are not yet
part of the law as drafted by Congress. For a court to require them
is to amend rather than to interpret the statute in question. This is
especially true since Congress has considered amendments to § 534
and has yet to pass anything comprehensive, thus indicating a legislative intent contrary to the one held by the court.
One proposed bill2 3 dealt with a number of the problems considered by the court in the present case. It would have limited dissemination of criminal arrest records to officers or employees of law
enforcement agencies and would have prohibited dissemination of
arrest records in the following situations: (1) where the record was
more than two years old if no prosecution was pending; (2) when the
prosecuting attorney agreed that no prosecution was warranted; or,
(3) if the record was expunged under the laws of the state in which
the arrest occurred by order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
The bill would also have allowed the individual the right to inspect
his own record and to obtain the names of all persons who had
copied it. He could have petitioned any United States court to correct the record or enjoin such maintenance or dissemination. The
bill did not become law. 4
After the district court decision in Menard v. Mitchell, a decision which could have been viewed as a restriction on the FBI's
ability to disseminate arrest and conviction records, a law was en21. 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
22. 507 F 2d at 1129.
23. H.R. 13315, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
24. Neither has subsequent legislation of the same nature succeeded in becoming law.
See Proposed Bills S. 1427 and H.R. 62, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), for the current versions
of the above noted proposed bill.
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acted to provide funds for the dissemination of arrest and conviction
records, not only to courts and law enforcement agencies, but also
[Flor the exchange of identification records with officials of federally
chartered or insured banking institutions to promote or maintain the
security of those institutions, and, if authorized by State statute and
approved by the Attorney General, to officials of State and local
governments for purposes of employment and licensing, any such
exchange to be made only for the official use of any such official and
subject to the same restrictions with respect to dissemination as that
provided for under the aforementioned Act.2"
This law represents a partial Congressional overruling of
Menard v. Mitchell and indicates that the Congressional position on
the FBI's role in the collection and dissemination of arrest and
conviction records is a less restrictive one than the present court's
view of what that role should be.
In 1974, subsequent to the Tarlton decision, Congress amended
Title 5 U.S.C. by adding § 552a.2 1 This Act requires federal agencies
to give detailed notice of the nature and uses of their personal data
banks and information system; establishes certain minimum standards for handling and processing personal information maintained
in the data banks and systems of the executive branch; gives the
individual the right, with certain exceptions, to be told upon request
whether or not there is a government record concerning that individual to have access to it and to challenge it with a hearing on request,
and with judicial review in federal court; and establishes a Privacy
Protection Commission to make a study of the major data banks
and other computerized information systems.27 Sections of this law
are applicable to criminal history files, e.g., the right to access.
However, the bill allows for certain exceptions regarding law enforcement agencies"s and the committee report notes that:
25. Pub. L. No. 92-184, 85 Stat. 627, 642 (1971). See also, e.g., Pub. L. No. 92-544, 86
Stat. 1109, 1115 (1972).
26. Privacy Act of 1974.
27. S. Rep. No. 93-1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
28. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552, provides, in part:
(j) General Exemptions.-The head of any agency may promulgate rules in accordance with the requirements (including general notice) of sections 553(b)(1), (2), and
(3), (c) and (e) of this title, to exempt any system of records within the agency from
any part of this section except subsections (b), (c)(1) and (2), (3), (4) (A) through (F),
(e) (6), (7), (9), (10), and (i) if the system of records is. . . (2) maintained by an agency
or component thereof which performs as its principle function any activity pertaining
to the enforcement of criminal laws, including police efforts to prevent, control, or
reduce crime or to apprehend criminals, and the activities of prosecutors, courts,
correctional probation, pardon or parole authorities, and which consists of (A) information compiled for the purpose of identifying individual criminal offenders and alleged
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S. 3418 permits each agency to promulgate its own regulations implementing the Act and this should provide sufficient flexibility so that
the Attorney General will not undermine good law enforcement practice in promulgating regulations. 9
The Committee further emphasized the need for added legislation
in the area of criminal justice."
There are some valid reasons for Congressional hesitancy. Even
the majority takes notice of the "difficult and sensitive questions
involved in reconciling policies of federalism and administrative
efficiency with the duty suggested by [this] discussion."'"
In any case, the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 534 is contrary
to the court's interpretation of the statute. As the dissent points out,
although the court's framing of the issue to be decided is innocuous
enough, the thrust of the opinion goes to the determination of "accuracy or constitutional accuracy" which necessarily implies that the
FBI has to judge whether information is "accurate or constitutionally accurate" before it can be disseminated. This duty is not created in the statute and would ultimately lead to an amendment
assigning the FBI a function that is traditionally judicial."
Unfortunately, the majority "scrupulously avoids" constitutional issues. Again, the dissent appears to reach the heart of the
matter:
If there is a constitutional requirement affecting the FBI's operations,
this court has a right to say so. If there is no constitutional requirement but only a statutory one, neither this court nor the district court
has the right to make a legislative oversight inquiry to determine the
need for additional legislation.2
Since the statutory interpretation reads far too much into the statute, it would seem more appropriate to discuss the constitutional
issues.
offenders and consisting only of identifying data and notations of arrests, the nature
and disposition of criminal charges, sentencing, confinement, release, and parole and
probation status ....
See also, "(k) Specific Exemptions" of the same bill.
29. Legislative History of Pub. L. 93-579, U.S. Cong. & Adm. News 6936, 6937 (1974);
the subsequent Department of Justice Rules and Regulations on the Criminal Justice Information System (1975) seem to be in direct response to this comment. 40 Fed. Reg. 22114 et
seq. (May 20, 1975), 28 C.F.R. § 20.1 et seq.
30. Legislative History of Pub. L. 93-579, U.S. Cong. & Adm. News 6936, 6938 (1974).
31. 507 F.2d at 1126.
32. As the dissent notes, this would put the FBI in the position of judging the constitutional accuracy of every record it disseminates. 507 F.2d at 1137.
33. Id. at 1132.
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IV.

THE PRIVACY ISSUE

The court points to the value of individual privacy which serves
to "insulate individuals from unjustifiable government interference."3 4 Reference is made to the expression of this right of privacy
in the fourth and fifth amendments and certain aspects of the first
amendment. However, this right has been employed in areas far
removed in application from the dissemination of criminal records,
and the use of analogous reasoning might be inappropriate. It would
be more efficient to directly attack the problem by specifying the
various rights, limitations and exceptions involved in the
dissemination-privacy controversy."
A judicially approved definition of the right of privacy is that
it is the right to be free from the unwarranted appropriation or
exploitation of one's personality, the publicizing of one's private
activities, in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering,
shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities. Prosser
considers the invasion of the right of privacy not as one tort but four
distinct torts: (1) intrusion upon one's seclusion or solitude, or into
his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embrassing private facts
about the plaintiff; (3) publicity which places one in a false light in
the public eye; and, (4) appropriation for the defendant's advantage
of the plaintiff's name or likeness.37
These definitions, however, do not really encompass the specific circumstances involved in a criminal history record system.
First and basically, an invasion of privacy normally involves some
sort of publicity-sometimes defined as publicity by the mass
media or publication to the general public. The court in Tarlton
points out that the present complaint "does [not] allege that the
information, whether accurate and complete or not, has been disseminated to unauthorized persons."3 Here the allegation is that
the incomplete or inaccurate information has influenced the court
34. Id. at 1124; the majority also makes reference to the Supreme Court's discussion of
privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
35. Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1975) is an example of a more exact
analysis in dealing with a dissemination problem. In Utz, appellants challenged the District
of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department's policy of routinely transmitting to the FBI
the fingerprint cards and accompanying identification data of individuals arrested in the
District of Columbia. The court held that the District of Columbia's "Duncan Ordinaire"
prohibited such a routine practice, either before conviction or after exoneration or both, as
long as the FBI continued to redisseminate that data for other than law enforcement purposes, and particularly for purposes of employment and licensing, 520 F.2d at 483-91.
36. 62 AM. JUR. 2d, Privacy § 1 (1972).
37. PROSSER, TORTS, § 117 at 802 (4th ed. 1971).
38. 507 F.2d at 1121.
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in imposing sentence on the petitioner and in denying parole. Both
the court and the parole board are not classified as the general
public, and their access to accurate and complete records is not
being challenged. Thus, public disclosure under Prosser's subcategories is not the issue.
Congress found that the privacy of an individual is directly
affected by the collection, maintenance, use and dissemination of
personal information by federal agencies.3 9 The Privacy Act of 1974
speaks of the collection of such personal data and the need to prevent such information collected for one purpose from being used for
another. 0 This right of privacy involves "the individual's ability to
control the flow of information which concerns or describes him." 4'
Criminal records have been expunged on the basis of a violation
of the right of privacy.4 2 However, such litigation usually involves
arrests resulting in acquittal or dismissal, where the right of the
individual to have fingerprints and photographs returned, absent a
compelling showing of necessity by the government is found to be
a fundamental right of privacy "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty. '1 3 Expungement is allowed in such cases on the premise
that since one is innocent until proven guilty, one not convicted of
a crime should not be subjected to the prejudice that confronts one
who possesses an arrest record." Thus, a right of privacy is involved
where records disseminated are either personal and misused, or
which-when public-might lead one reading them to conclusions
unfounded or prejudicial to the individual45
The above considerations are clearly not involved in the present
case. Here, "appellant does not deny that he was in fact arrested
39. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552. See § 2(a)(1).
40. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552. See § 2(b)(2).
41. Miller at 1107. See note 1, supra.
42. Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (1972); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App.
334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971).
43. Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157, 161 (1972). It is interesting to note
that Judge Cardozo, in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), used this phrase as
an indication of a due process right.
44. For hardship confronting the individual due to prejudice surrounding the mere fact
of having an arrest record see Miller, The Closed Door: The Effect of a Criminal Record on
Employment with State and Local Public Agencies, introduced as testimony and reproduced
in Hearings on H.R. 13315 Before Subcommittee Four of the Committee of the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) beginning at 259; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY, 75 (1967);
Karabian, Record of Arrest: The Indelible Stain, 3 PACIFIC L.J. 20 (1972); see also note 2,
supra.
45. These situations would involve Prosser's classifications of intrusion and false light
in the public eye. See note 36, supra.
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and convicted as shown by his FBI record." 4 Instead he alleges that
a large number of arrests and convictions in his file were invalid and
that his apparently long history of crime is not a true reflection of
the facts.47 Since petitioner's major contention does not deal with
private information, records reported inaccurately, mistaken reports, dissemination to unauthorized people or reports of arrests
resulting in dismissal or acquittal, a right of privacy as conventionally defined does not seem to be directly involved. On the whole,
then, analysis in terms of "privacy" considerations is most unsatisfactory.
V.

DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS

However, there is a constitutional right that Tarlton could possibly have been denied. While it may be stretching logic to assert
that in the particular case at hand, appellant's privacy was invaded,
he might have a valid reason for redress: a denial of due process. If,
as alleged, some of Tarlton's convictions were based on charges
under unconstitutionally vague statutes and others were obtained
without affording appellant the use of an attorney, his record might
clearly be "constitutionally inaccurate." Furthermore, there are
procedural rights guaranteed at sentencing and parole hearings
since such authorities are required to sentence on an accurate and
constitutional criminal record. Therefore, this can be identified as
a due process problem.
If Tarlton has been denied his due process before the law, what
remedy is available to him? Tarlton is asking for a "retroactive duty
of affirmative inquiry" to be placed on the FBI.48 While the majority
does not point to a duty so great as this, it does hold that there is a
duty to maintain reasonably accurate or Constitutionally accurate
files. To place the full burden of this duty on the FBI and the
District Court for the District of Columbia is inefficient, impractical
and unreasonable.
With means already available to the individual to seek vacation
of convictions due to violations of his constitutional rights, it is more
expedient and logical for petitioner to follow established procedures
in the courts having jurisidiction over the alleged infraction. Since
evidence seized in violation of one's constitutional rights can be
46. Brief for Appellant at 19, Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116.
47. There were five entries of arrest 'vhich petitioner contends did not result in prosecution. However, the court primarily looks to the 12 arrest and conviction entries which Tarlton
alleged were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.
48. 507 F.2d at 1135.
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suppressed from use at trial as the fruit of an illegal seizure,4" the
record of an arrest or conviction-obtained unconstitutionallycould be treated similarly and ordered expunged.
Upon presentation of proper proof, the FBI would then have the
duty to update its records, expunge what was illegally obtained, and
yet not have to judicially interpret the record. If Tarlton is an extension of Menard v. Saxbe, the logical inference is that in addition to
the duty of correcting records on notice of local law enforcement
agencies, there would be an additional duty on the FBI to correct
constitutionally inaccurate arrest and conviction records on notice
from the courts.
An affirmative duty could be placed on the petitioner to go
forward in a judicial determination asserting violation of his constitutional rights. Thus, the petitioner would have a remedy to redress
his injury while the FBI's duty would be limited simply to the
correction of what has been shown to be factually inaccurate.
Of course, to begin this process petitioner must have access to
his file. As noted, the Privacy Act of 1974 grants the individual
access to his file with certain exceptions. 0
Other more affirmative duties to be imposed on the FBI might
also be needed to guarantee the ordinary citizen's due process of law
regarding criminal history files. The following could be established
to facilitate the FBI's role as more than a "mere repository" of
records but less than a "guarantor" of this accuracy. (1) The FBI
might be required to implement computer software to periodically
output incomplete reports, with the subsequent task of requesting
the disposition of the case from the local law enforcement agencies
involved. 1 This would place some affirmative duty on the FBI com49. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
50. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1974), amending 5 U.S.C.§ 552. See § (d). This is an essential first
step since in addition to the possible hardship to the individual, it seems unthinkable that
the "right to life, liberty and property" would not encompass a right to see the facts of one's
own life that are available for other designated people to see. Furthermore, recent Department of Justice rules and regulations concerning criminal history records require that an
individual upon whom information has been collected, be permitted to review any criminal
history information maintained about him for the purpose of challenge or correction. 40 Fed.
Reg. 22114 et seq. (May 20, 1975), 28 C.F.R. § 20.1 et seq., especially § 20.34.
51. Although the new Justice Department regulations place some additional duties on
the FBI, correction, accuracy and completeness of information held in the NCIC/CCH will
continue to be the responsibility of the contributing agency. Furthermore, although agencies
will be required to institute data collection, entry, storage, and systematic audit procedures
to minimize the possibility of recording and storing inaccurate information, an FBI spokesman said that the rules do not affect the current practice of disseminating outdated arrest
records without disposition for law enforcement purposes. Computerworld, July 11, 1975 at
. Previously, former Attorney General Katzenbach testified before Subcommittee Four
of the Committee on the Judiciary considering H.R. 13315, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), that
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puter center but is justified since the effect of criminal records on
the individual is excerbated by the fact that they are available on a
nation-wide basis. Furthermore, regular updating and correction of
records would not only be beneficial to the individual but would also
aid law enforcement agencies since they would then be receiving on
request a more accurate and updated report on the subject of their
inquiry. (2) Another duty would be to correct and expunge records
on the demonstration of court action vacating the conviction or
dismissing the arrest because of constitutional irregularities. (3) To
implement the above policies, a review board might be set up to
process requests for expungement when the individual seeking redress can demonstrate to some degree of certainty the inaccuracy
or mistake."
Such a proposed arrangement would initially require additional
funds and result in some inconvenience to the administrative workings of the FBI. However, such a procedure could remove unnecessary litigation from the courts by establishing workable guidelines,
and aid the FBI's NCIC in running more smoothly and efficiently.
Aside from economic and administrative considerations, the fact
that there is such a huge and widely disseminated record system in
itself would seem to imply a duty to make such a file as accurate as
possible.
Such a proposal obviously goes far beyond an interpretation of
28 U.S.C. § 534. However, it is not inconsistent with judicial responsibility or authority to note that in addition to a right of privacy
concerning proper dissemination of criminal history files, there is
also a due process right of accuracy in the maintenance of such files.
BarbaraPugliese Gorman
it would be technically possible to achieve the objective of monitoring arrest records with an
automatic cancellation or purging program. As to the information already in the FBI computer, he said, "You can put it in and you can take it out, you can add to the disposition of
it, you can do a great deal with it." Subcommittee Report at p. 7, supra.
52. Presently, the right of challenge is not supported by an arbitration procedure for
determining whether the individual or the agency decides to amend or otherwise change the
record.
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